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ABSTRACT 
With growing concerns for cyber security of critical infrastructures like the power grid, 
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) security testbeds are essential in providing controlled testing 
environments for evaluating and validating novel CPS security tools and technologies, thereby 
accelerating the transition of research to industrial practice. The engineering of such testbeds 
requires significant investments in money, time and modeling efforts to provide a scalable, 
high-fidelity, realistic attack/defense platform. Therefore, there is a strong need in research 
community, academia and industry to create remotely accessible testbeds that enable access to 
a broader user community through frameworks that support a range of use-cases such as 
vulnerability assessments, impact analysis, product testing, attack-defense exercises, and 
operator training. This thesis will focus on remote access framework that has been 
implemented on PowerCyber - CPS security testbed for Smart Grid at Iowa State University. 
Firstly, this thesis introduces the motivation for enabling remote access on PowerCyber 
by reviewing state-of-the-art work in the area along with engineering challenges. Secondly, 
the thesis elaborates on fundamental building blocks that enable remote experimentation, such 
as the front-end user interface, backend experiment automation and also describes the 
architecture, overall design flow and story-board constructs of the remote access framework. 
Thirdly, the thesis describes a case study of coordinated cyber-attack/defense experimentation 
on a wide-area power system protection scheme called Remedial Action Scheme using 
PowerCyber remote access framework. Details of how the remote access framework facilitated 
diverse user community engagement is included with survey results, use-case studies and user 
feedback. Finally, the thesis concludes by identifying future work to broaden the scope and 
features of PowerCyber remote access framework developed.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Smart Grid – A Cyber-Physical System 
Cyber-Physical systems(CPS) are smart systems that consist of computational and physical 
components that are seamlessly integrated through highly networked communications. These 
components involve a high degree of complexity at numerous spatial and temporal scales which 
closely interact to sense the changing state of the real world [6]. Cyber-Physical systems provide 
the foundation of critical infrastructures such as electric power generation and delivery, 
personalized health care, emergency response, traffic flow management, etc. These systems form 
the basis of emerging and future smart services, and improve quality of life in many existing areas 
as well as many other areas being envisioned. Popular CPS technologies include: Smart Grid, 
Smart Cities, Internet of Things (IoT), Industrial Internet, etc. [24] 
An increasing demand for reliable energy and numerous technological advancements 
motivated the development of smarter electric grids. The smart grid is an automated, widely 
distributed, cyber-physical energy production and delivery system integrated with 
communications and information technology, characterized by two-way flow of electricity and 
information [7, 25]. Smart grid modernization initiative involves deployment of a variety of 
individual technical initiatives such as Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), Distribution 
Automation (DA), Demand Response (DR), Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection and Control 
systems (WAMPAC) based on Phasor Measurement Units (PMU), large scale renewable 
integration in the form of Wind and Solar generation, and Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles 
(PHEV). Of these initiatives, AMI and WAMPAC depend heavily on the cyber infrastructure as 
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data is transported through several communication protocols to utility control centers and the 
consumers [26]. The remainder of this section will provide an overview of AMI which is associated 
with the distribution system, and WAMPAC which is associated with the bulk power system. 
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI)  
AMI is an integrated system of smart meters, communication networks and data 
management systems (DMS) that enables two-way communication between the utility and the 
customers. The main goal of AMI is enhancing reliability of electricity generation and distribution 
while maintaining cost effectiveness. AMI’s are used by utilities to collect current usage 
information, perform remote meter readings, send real-time pricing data to consumers, detect 
outages remotely, offer prepaid options to customers and analyze faults within the distribution 
system. On the other hand, smart meters provide the customers with granular control over their 
consumption and also facilitate increased integration of Distributed Energy Resources (DER). 
Demand Side Management (DSM) enabled by AMI exercises direct/indirect control over 
consumer power consumption [26, 27]. 
Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) 
 Wide Area Monitoring, Protection and Control systems (WAMPAC) are used to accurately 
analyze the flow of electricity through bulk power system. WAMPAC leverages the Phasor 
Measurements Units (PMUs) which provides high sampling rates and accurate GPS-based timing 
to gain real-time awareness of current grid operations and provide real-time protection and control 
functions such as Special Protection Schemes (SPS) and Automatic Generation Control (AGC). 
These are also used by other emerging applications such as oscillation detection, and transient 
stability predictions. WAMPAC can be subdivided further into its constituent components namely, 
3 
 
Wide-Area Monitoring Systems (WAMS), Wide-Area Protection Systems (WAP), and Wide-Area 
Control Systems (WAC) [26, 27]. 
 Wide-Area Monitoring Systems 
The full potential of PMU data cannot be realized without sharing readings. WAMS 
provide monitoring techniques by utilizing PMU measurement data that are shared among 
utilities and other regulators. NASPInet (North American Synchro-Phasor Initiative Network) 
serves as an example of WAMS deployment, where a separate network was developed for the 
transmission and sharing of real-time control data [26, 27]. 
 Wide-Area Protection 
Wide-Area Protection (WAP) prevents propagation of larger disturbances by collecting 
system wide information over a wide geographic area to perform fast decision-making and 
switching actions. One of the most common Wide-Area Protection scheme is Special 
Protection Schemes (SPS) which is an automation system designed to detect system 
abnormalities, take corrective actions such as isolating faulted components and maintaining 
system reliability [28]. 
 Wide-Area Control  
Automatic Generation Control (AGC) is a major Wide-Area Control mechanism in the 
power grid which corrects system generation with respect to load changes to maintain grid 
frequency at 60 Hz. The AGC functions with the help of tie line flow measurements, frequency 
and generation data obtained from Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
infrastructure. Other WAC applications such as secondary voltage control, static VAR 
compensator, inter-area oscillation which use PMU data are still in their nascent stages [26]. 
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1.2 Smart Grid Cyber Threats 
As the electric grid evolves into a Smart Grid to provide a reliable, secure and resilient 
electricity transmission and distribution system, the dependence on cutting edge automation and 
networking technologies has increased tremendously. The advent of high accuracy, time 
synchronized, high data rate synchrophasor measurements and other modern substation 
automation systems over the grid, which are deployed to monitor, control and protect the power 
grid, have resulted in increased network connectivity to corporate IT networks. These connections 
were often created without an understanding of the potential consequences and thereby, have 
increased the attack surface of the system. Though attacks targeted at these systems are not 
frequent, their physical, economic and social impacts can be quite severe if successful [8, 11]. 
Several authoritative government reports and technical literature have documented increasing 
concerns for highly sophisticated, advanced persistent cyber threats on critical infrastructures, 
especially the power grid.  
 McAfee study on “Critical Infrastructure in the age of Cyber War” [1] highlights that Critical 
infrastructure owners and operators have reported that their networks and control systems are 
under repeated cyberattack, often from high level adversaries like foreign nation-states. 
Assaults run the gamut from massive DDoS attacks designed to shut down systems all the way 
to stealthy efforts to enter networks undetected. 
 “W32. Stuxnet Dossier” released by Symantec Security Response [2], describes Stuxnet as a 
malware primarily written to target industrial control systems (ICS) which are used in power 
plants and gas pipelines. End goal of Stuxnet was to reprogram industrial control systems (ICS) 
by modifying code on programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to make them work in a manner 
the attacker intended and to hide those changes from the operator of the equipment. 
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 On December 23, 2015 a regional Ukrainian electricity distribution company reported service 
outages to customers due to a third party’s illegal entry into the company’s computer and 
SCADA systems. This cyberattack disconnected seven 110 kv and twenty-three 35 kv 
substations for three hours, impacted additional portions of the distribution grid and forced 
operators to switch to manual mode. The attack resulted in outages that caused approximately 
225,000 customers to lose power across various areas [31].  
 A jointly commissioned summary report of the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation and the U.S. Department of Energy [3], focuses on High-impact, Low-Frequency 
(HILF) events such as pandemic illness, coordinated cyber, physical, or blended attack on the 
system, extreme solar weather, and the high-altitude detonation of a nuclear weapon with the 
potential to cause long-term, catastrophic damage to the bulk power system. 
 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessment [4, 5] addresses key cybersecurity 
requirements in each Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) sectors, cybersecurity 
technologies which can be applied to CIP and implementation issues associated with using 
cybersecurity technologies for CIP, including policy issues such as privacy and information 
sharing. 
 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) released a “Guide to Industrial Control 
Systems (ICS) Security” [29] which identifies adversarial threats to ICS to emphasize the 
necessity to create a defense in depth strategy for the ICS.  
Thus there is a growing need in academia, industry and research community to develop and 
validate novel security tools and algorithms for securing the smart grid and making it attack-
resilient. 
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1.3 CPS Security Testbeds 
Attempts to research smart grid cyber security enhancements are constrained by the 
availability of realistic cyber-physical environments. Testbeds that integrate both cyber and 
physical components provide ideal environments to perform and evaluate research efforts [9]. 
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) security testbeds provide controlled testing environments for 
realistic, attack/defense experimentation and also serve as a platform for evaluating and validating 
novel CPS security tools and technologies, thereby accelerating the transition of state-of-the-art 
research to industrial practice. CPS security testbeds capture computation, communication and 
physical system dynamics appropriately through a combination of simulated, emulated and 
physical system components respectively. In the past decade, several educational institutions and 
national labs have been developing CPS security testbeds for validating and evaluating the various 
cyber security tools and technologies, and also to provide realistic test environments for 
attack/defense experimentation. In this section, few prominent CPS security testbeds are identified 
along with a brief discussion of the use-cases they support and their capabilities to enable remote 
experimentation. 
1.3.1  DETER Testbed 
The DETER testbed at University of Southern California's Information Sciences Institute, is a 
large-scale testbed for cyber security experimentation [16]. DETER is a multi-user testbed that 
provides remote users the tools to create custom experiments by provisioning appropriate 
computing resources such as virtual machines on the dedicated server clusters. Users can configure 
their experiments by choosing from a set of available computing nodes, and by specifying network 
topologies to interconnect these nodes. DETER also provides automated scripting features to 
orchestrate complex experiments, however, it lacks CPS resources, specific to the power grid such 
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as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) software, Remote Terminal Units (RTU), 
relays and phasor measurement units, to perform hardware-in-the-loop experimentation in 
conjunction with its computing resources. 
1.3.2 powerNET Testbed 
The powerNET testbed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is an ongoing research 
effort that goes beyond the capabilities of the DETER testbed to provide a multi-user, remotely 
configurable testbed environment for research on multiple areas including CPS security 
experimentation [17]. The powerNET testbed leverages emerging open source cloud computing 
platforms such as OpenStack, in conjunction with its Industrial Control Systems hardware such as 
relays, PMUs, real-time power system simulator, and the associated SCADA software such as 
Energy Management Systems, to enable hardware-in-the-loop cyber security experimentation. 
However, the testbed has not yet been made available to the research community as some of its 
features are under development. 
1.3.3 National SCADA Testbed (NSTB) 
The National SCADA Testbed (NSTB) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is a collaborative 
research effort by several Department of Energy National labs across the U.S to create a CPS 
security testbed for the Smart Grid. The NSTB consists of physical and cyber system resources to 
perform vulnerability assessments and impact analysis studies [18]. Though the NSTB was utilized 
to perform vulnerability assessments, product testing, and red team - blue team training exercises, 
open, remote access to the testbed resources was not one of the project's priorities. 
1.3.4 WSU Smart Grid Testbed 
Washington State University(WSU) includes two currently interconnected testbeds, the Smart 
City Testbed and Smart Grid Demonstration Research Investigation Laboratory (SGDRIL). The 
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testbeds are designed to perform detailed Cyber-Physical System simulations and to evaluate smart 
grid cybersecurity technologies within realistic environments. The testbeds span both transmission 
and distribution domains, included control system software, various embedded control devices, 
and real-time simulation capabilities [23]. 
1.3.5 NREL (National Renewable Energy Laboratory) Smart Grid Testbed 
NREL’s Secure Distribution Grid Management (DGM) testbed runs DGM use cases using a 
combination of virtual grid and real power systems assets to evaluate critical cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities and the effectiveness of risk mitigations through sound network design, stringent 
security controls through firewalls, access control lists on network switches and cutting edge 
cybersecurity technologies [30]. One of the key areas of focus in the testbed is the integration of 
Information Technologies (IT) and Operations Technologies (OT) side of a typical distribution 
utility. It is a major effort for utilities to integrate these two areas to support cross-cutting Smart 
Grid applications while maintaining a strong cybersecurity posture. 
1.3.6 ISU PowerCyber Testbed 
The Cyber-Physical Power Grid Testbed, PowerCyber, is a hardware-in-the-loop hybrid 
test platform (real, simulation, and emulation) [9]. The SCADA portion of the testbed composed 
of industry-grade hardware/software from Siemens that include substation automation system 
(SICAM PAS), control center software (Power TG), SCADA and substation communication 
protocols (DNP, IEC 61850), and security technologies (Scalance: Firewall, VPN), and 
multifunction protection relays (7SJ610, 7SJ82). The testbed also has been integrated with three 
SEL 421 PMUs and Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC). ISERink is a virtual environment for cyber 
defense competitions, and attack-defense evaluations. 
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1.3.7 Other CPS Security Testbeds 
Several other notable CPS security testbeds have been developed in the recent years, such as 
the Virtual Control System Environment testbed at Sandia National Laboratory [19], Virtual Power 
System Testbed at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign [20], SCADA security testbed 
at Mississippi State University [21] and SCADA testbed at University College, Dublin [22]. These 
CPS security testbeds have been used to perform vulnerability assessments on SCADA devices 
communication protocols, and software, impact analysis for realistic cyber-attack scenarios, and 
developing defense measures such as anomaly/intrusion detection, besides several other related 
topics. 
1.3.8 Comparison of Testbed capabilities 
 - Existing Capabilities   - Capabilities enabled by this thesis work 
Table 1.1 Testbed capability comparison 
Capabilities/Resources 
ISU 
Testbed 
WSU 
Testbed 
NREL 
Testbed 
DETER 
Testbed 
Diversity of ICS Devices (Substation 
Automation, RTUs, Relays, PMUs) 
    
Diversity of ICS Protocols (ICCP, 
DNP3, Modbus, IEC 61850, IEEE 
C37.118) 
    
Cyber Systems (SCADA EMS, DMS)     
Physical Systems (Real-time 
Simulation) 
    
Advanced Networking (Stub Intranet, 
Internet connections) 
    
Federation of Resources     
Cyber System Virtualization     
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 - Existing Capabilities   - Capabilities enabled by this thesis work 
Table 1.1 (continued) 
Virtualization of ICS Devices     
Experiment Orchestration     
Remote Accessibility and 
Configuration 
    
Multi-user Support     
Cyber Security Toolsets & Devices     
Sandboxing of ICS devices     
Support for Performance Evaluation     
Cyber Defense Exercises     
 
1.4 Thesis Motivation 
Development process of CPS Security Testbeds is not well established due to the complexity 
of integrating cyber and physical resources while also incorporating simulation mechanisms to 
model power systems, cyber network dynamics, and security events [9]. The engineering of CPS 
security testbeds requires significant investments in time, money and modeling efforts to provide 
a scalable, high-fidelity, real-time attack/defense platform. Therefore, there is a strong need in the 
research community to create remotely accessible CPS security testbeds that enable access to a 
broader user community through open, remote access frameworks that support a range of use-
cases pertaining to CPS security of the grid, including vulnerability assessments, impact analysis, 
product testing, attack-defense exercises, and operator training. From the literature survey it is 
clearly evident that remote access to a broad user community has not been addressed in any of the 
testbed efforts except DETER which lacks CPS resources. Thus there is an immediate need to 
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develop remotely accessible CPS Security Testbeds for the benefit of research, academia and 
industry. However, the engineering of a scalable, flexible, multi-user, remote access testbed for 
CPS security experimentation has a broad spectrum of challenges. The reminder of this section 
identifies such challenges and wherever possible, potential solutions to overcome some of the 
challenges are identified and discussed. 
 Scalability 
One of the most critical challenges in creating a scalable remote access is scalability. As we 
increase the scale of the power system model, the associated cyber system model increases. This 
translates to increased resource requirements for performing real-time simulations with hardware-
in-the-loop experimentation. Therefore, power system scalability would be limited to the 
maximum system size that the power system simulator can support for a real-time simulation. 
Scalability in cyber system VM's could be easily overcome with deploying additional computing 
resources such as server racks, however, increasing power system simulation capabilities at the 
same level is prohibitively expensive. To some extent, this could be handled by abstracting and 
equivalencing parts of the system model that are not directly involved in the experiment. This also 
would help to minimize the amount of physical hardware devices that need to be mapped into the 
real-time simulation. Though scalability for physical components like relays and PMU's are also 
comes at a price, to some extent we can get around device scalability with relay emulators, which 
replicate the entire communication behaviors that are essential to cyber security experimentation. 
 Concurrency and Isolation 
One of the main differences between the implementation of a remote access framework for 
a CPS security testbed vs. a regular cyber security testbed setup like DETER would be the problem 
of concurrent, multi-user experiments. There exist several options to virtualize and 
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compartmentalize computing resources like VM's to provide isolation, security for multiple-
concurrent users. However, the problem of sharing expensive, limited physical components such 
as relays, PMU's, and real-time power system simulators between multiple concurrent users is 
much more complicated and requires additional research and development effort. 
 Flexibility 
Extending the discussion on concurrency, the flexibility of a CPS security testbed is much 
lesser when compared to a traditional cyber security testbed. Specifically, the configuration of 
physical components such as relays and PMU's need to be changed dynamically based on user 
inputs for different types of experiments. Some of the software that are used to program these 
devices are based on a graphical user interface and therefore are not very amenable to automated 
scripting. While there are command line tools that automate mouse clicks on GUI, this approach 
is not very flexible and suitable for a wide range of scenarios. 
 Troubleshooting 
Troubleshooting remote, automated experiments when things don't work as expected 
presents tough challenges on any type of testbed. Especially, in CPS environments, with SCADA 
devices, and communication protocols, this challenge is even harder to overcome due to inherent 
design weaknesses in terms of security, and the heterogeneity of devices. Typically, SCADA 
devices have been built with usability, reliability as a preference over security. This leads to 
unexpected failure modes in devices during cyber-attack/defense experimentation. Consequently, 
failures are hard to debug in an automated manner. Therefore, it is extremely important to test all 
scenarios thoroughly for possible failure modes manually before completely automating them. 
Also, due to these limitations, the remote access provided to users would be mostly driven by a 
13 
 
template-based experiment model, rather than allowing complete customization of the 
experiments. 
1.5  Thesis Organization 
The main contribution of this thesis is enabling remote accessibility, configuration and 
experiment orchestration on PowerCyber testbed by implementing remote access framework. This 
thesis is structured as follows 
 Chapter 2 introduces PowerCyber testbed with architecture details and use cases. The chapter 
explains the implementation details of remote access framework with architecture and design 
flow. 
 Chapter 3 discusses remote access framework story board constructs with details of how the 
remote access framework was used to perform a coordinated attack/defense experiment case 
study on wide-area protection scheme with step-by-step screenshots and explanation. 
 Chapter 4 explains details of academic and industrial user community engagement with use 
case studies evaluating the remote access framework. 
 Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by identifying future work in this direction to broaden the 
scope and features of PowerCyber remote access framework. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PowerCyber - REMOTE ACCESS FRAMEWORK 
2.1 PowerCyber: Testbed Overview 
The PowerCyber testbed at Iowa State University, consists of a hybrid mix of industry 
standard hardware and software, emulated components and real-time power system simulators for 
hardware-in-the-loop CPS security experimentation for the Smart Grid. The PowerCyber test-bed 
provides a virtual critical infrastructure environment wherein realistic experiments on wide area 
monitoring, wide area control and distributed decision making in the smart grid environment can 
be carried out. 
2.1.1 PowerCyber Testbed Architecture 
 
 
Figure 2.1 PowerCyber CPS Security Testbed Architecture 
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Figure 2.1 shows the current architecture of  the PowerCyber CPS Security testbed at ISU.  
The testbed consists of SCADA hardware/software with emulation and simulation techniques that 
include substation automation system (SICAM PAS), control center software (Power TG), 
SCADA and substation communication protocols (DNP3, IEC 61850, IEEE C37.118), and 
security technologies (Scalance: Firewall, VPN), four multifunction protection relays (7SJ610, 
7SJ82), three SEL 421 Phasor Measurement Units (PMU) and a Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC) 
to provide an accurate electric grid cyber infrastructure. The testbed employs virtualization 
technologies to address scalability concerns and reduce development cost. The testbed has also 
been integrated with the Internet Scale Event and Attack Generation Environment (ISEAGE) 
project at Iowa State to provide wide-area network emulation and advanced attack simulation. 
Power simulations are performed using Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS), Opal-RT for real 
time evaluations and DIgSILIENT PowerFactory software for non-real time analysis [9]. 
2.1.2 PowerCyber Supported Use Cases 
PowerCyber has been leveraged to support the following types of use cases that are relevant 
to cyber physical security experimentation for the grid. 
2.1.2.1 Vulnerability Assessment 
PowerCyber supports vulnerability assessment of industry grade SCADA software and 
hardware platforms, network protocols and configurations to detect unknown vulnerabilities based 
on standard vulnerability databases. Several unknown vulnerabilities were discovered and a 
responsible disclosure process was followed to disclose them to vendors and appropriate 
regulatory authorities [10]. 
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2.1.2.2 Impact Analysis and Mitigation Research 
PowerCyber provides a realistic virtual critical infrastructure environment wherein realistic 
experiments on wide-area monitoring, protection, and control in the smart grid environment can 
be carried out. Specifically, the testbed has been used to evaluate coordinated attacks on Remedial 
Action Schemes [9], and data integrity attacks on automatic generation control [11]. Also, the 
testbed allows the implementation of defense measures such as firewalls, intrusion detection 
systems, software patches, etc., to also evaluate the performance of various mitigation strategies. 
2.1.2.3 Testbed Federation 
Recently, the PowerCyber testbed was successfully federated with the DETER testbed and 
the ISERINK platform, as part of Smart America Challenge and NIST Global City Teams 
Challenge to create a large-scale, high-fidelity CPS security testbed environment. The federated 
testbed was used to demonstrate proof-of-concept attack/defense experimentation on a wide-area 
protection scheme [12, 13]. Additional use cases to showcase the utility of CPS testbed federation 
are currently being explored. 
2.1.2.4 Attack-Defense Exercises & Operator training 
The PowerCyber testbed and the ISERINK platform for cyber defense competitions [14] 
had been recently integrated to conduct realistic cyber-attack/defense training exercises for utility 
practitioners at the NERC GridSecCon 2015 conference [15]. Also, PowerCyber has been used 
every year as part of an industry workshop to provide hands-on training sessions. 
2.1.2.5 Model Development 
PowerCyber testbed is currently developing a repository of standardized models and 
experimental datasets for power systems and associated cyber systems to facilitate researchers in 
leveraging the testbed capabilities for cyber security experimentation. 
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2.1.2.6 Remote Access 
In order to engage and enable a broad user community to perform a variety of power grid 
related cyber security experimentation, a remote access framework has been developed on the 
PowerCyber testbed.  
2.2 Remote Access Framework 
The remote access framework interacts with the remote users via a Front-end Web server, 
which provides a web-based user interface that allows users to configure the relevant parameters 
needed for the automated attack/defense experimentation. The front-end web server is integrated 
tightly to a backend orchestration framework, which is written in Python. The backend framework 
orchestrates the creation/configuration of the necessary cyber resources such as the SCADA virtual 
machines, manages the interaction with the power system simulators and physical devices such as 
the relays and PMUs, coordinates various attack actions and defense measures depending on the 
user input, and also provides a way for the users to collect relevant simulation artifacts from the 
cyber system and the physical system in the form of log files, packet captures, plots, etc., Figure 
2.2 shows the overall framework for enabling remote CPS security experimentation. 
The Real-Time Grid Simulation module performs actions such as model compilation, loading, and 
execution on a real-time power system simulator and appropriately maps components such as 
relays and PMUs on the power system model based on user selection. The SCADA configuration 
module spawns SCADA virtual machines such as the control center VM's that house the Energy 
Management Systems (EMS) software, substation RTU VM's, and connects these VM's according 
to user specified communication topology. The module also appropriately initializes SCADA 
communications between the various devices and verifies communications between the SCADA 
VM's and the hardware devices that are mapped into the experiment. Based on the user's selection, 
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the attack orchestration module coordinates and triggers attack actions on appropriate SCADA 
components. The attack module spawns attacker virtual machines once all the initializations have 
been performed appropriately. The attack script includes user selected attack actions from the 
attack template library. 
 
Figure 2.2 Remote Access Framework 
The defense instrumentation module implements host based or network based mitigation 
mechanisms such as firewall rules, and intrusion/anomaly detection systems appropriately based 
on user input. Depending on the experimental scenario chosen by the user, appropriate inputs are 
obtained for the scenario with respect to the power system model, hardware device mapping, 
communication network topologies, attack parameters and defense parameters. This allows the 
users to run their own experiments within the limitations of the template experimental scenarios 
that are provided as initial inputs. As the capabilities of the remote access framework mature, more 
flexibility would be available to the users to select their own experimental scenarios by using 
custom power system models, relay/ PMU configurations, attack vectors, and defense mechanisms 
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such as anomaly/intrusion detection algorithms. The following sections present a detailed 
description of the implementation methodology of the remote access framework.  
2.2.1 Implementation Architecture 
Figure 2.3 shows the implementation architecture of the PowerCyber remote access 
framework that was described earlier. The architecture describes remotely accessible PowerCyber 
testbed that consists of several interconnected VM's (SCADA, power system control, attack, 
defense, gateway), power system simulators, and physical devices such as relays and PMU's for 
performing hardware-in-the-loop experimentation.  
The implementation architecture of the remote access CPS security testbed consists of three 
fundamental building blocks. 
 
Figure 2.3 Remote Access Framework – Implementation Architecture 
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2.2.1.1 Front-end Web Server  
The front-end web server interacts with the user through a web-based user interface. It 
provides options to select and customize experimental scenarios and also provides options to 
collect experimental results. 
2.2.1.2 Backend Orchestration Framework  
The back-end orchestration framework performs various tasks to automate the 
experimental scenario chosen, and interacts with the front-end web server to collect inputs and 
provide experimental results. 
2.2.1.3 Models and Libraries  
In order to provide standard experimental scenarios as part of the remote access web 
interface a library of commonly used power system models need to be developed. This includes 
models with appropriate WAMPAC applications modeled, commonly used attack vectors, defense 
measures, etc., 
The front-end web server and backend orchestration framework are hosted inside a virtual 
machine host, and would spawn the various virtual machines that are required as part of the 
experiment in the ESXi server. The front-end web server pushes user inputs as parameters to the 
backend orchestration framework, which is scripted using Python. The master backend script 
triggers multiple slave scripts which perform different functions along different stages in the 
design flow of the remote experimentation. The SCADA configuration script spawns control 
center VM and substation VM's depending on the experiment. The SCADA VM's are configured 
in a user specified network topology using virtual switches and gateways. Also, the backend scripts 
ensure that the virtual machines communicate with physical relays and PMU's that would be 
mapped into the experiment through the appropriate power system model. The power system 
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simulation automation script spawns a power system control node VM, which interacts with the 
Power System Simulators such as OPAL-RT, RTDS. This script provides the capability to 
compile/load a power system model on the simulator and allows interaction with the model to 
perform run-time control actions either through script or GUI and also view real-time power 
system impacts or obtain results in the form of data files or plots respectively. The defense script 
configures network based defense measures such as firewall rules or intrusion detection system 
rules on the virtual gateway, and/or host based defense measures on user specified components in 
the SCADA VM's. The attack script spawns attacker virtual machines, which would be triggered 
by the master script once all the initializations have been performed appropriately. The attack script 
includes user selected attack actions from the attack template library. Once the experiments are 
performed, the master script can pull cyber system artifacts such as firewall and intrusion detection 
log files, network packet captures, network performance statistics, etc., from the various SCADA 
VM's and the gateway/defense nodes. Also, as mentioned previously, the master script interacts 
with the power system control scripts to pull relevant physical system simulation artifacts. 
2.2.2 Design Flow 
The following list represents key steps in the overall design flow for performing automated, cyber-
attack/defense experimentation: 
 Power system configuration  
The first stage involves the selection of the power system model to be used for the experiment. 
For example, the standard IEEE system models such as 39 bus, 118 bus, etc., 
 WAMPAC experiment selection 
Once the power system model has been selected, the next stage is to identify the Wide-Area 
Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) experiment that is to be used for the experiment. 
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This stage would also involve an identification of how the physical components are mapped to the 
power system model. 
 Cyber system configuration  
This stage involves actions to appropriately spawn SCADA VM's such as Control Center, 
Substation VM's depending on the WAMPAC experimental scenario chosen, and ensuring that the 
appropriate network topology is setup between the various VM's and the hardware devices that are 
mapped as part of the scenario. 
 Defense configuration 
After the power system and cyber system configuration steps are performed, the next stage 
involves actions to spawn defense measures. The defense measures could be setup either in the 
communication gateway nodes or on the individual hosts depending on the experimental scenarios 
and user inputs. 
 Attack Configuration 
Once all the systems are configured and initialized, the next stage is to spawn the attacker VM's 
and execute the attack vector on specified targets in coordination with the backend orchestration 
framework. 
 Collecting Cyber System Results 
After the execution of the specified attack scenario, the next stage involves the collection of 
experimental artifacts on the cyber layer such as log files, packet captures, network performance 
metrics from the various systems. 
 Collecting Physical System Results 
The last stage involves the collection of power system simulation artifacts in the form of 
datasets, or plots of system states such as voltages, power ow and frequency. 
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The following subsections describe in detail the various activities that are performed as part of 
the overall design flow with respect to user interface (front-end) and experiment automation (back-
end). 
2.2.2.1 User Interface Design 
The user interface provides the user with an array of templates to select from and configure 
the system to perform a specific type of cyber-attack/ defense experiment. Figure 2.4 shows the 
various activities with respect to the design flow for remote experimentation pertaining to the user 
interface. The user interface allows the user to select the power system model that is to be used 
from a list of choices such as IEEE 39 bus model IEEE 118 bus model, etc., As part of Step 2, the 
user can select the WAMPAC experimental scenarios to be used. For example, the list of available 
scenarios could be Remedial Action Schemes, Automatic Generation Control, State Estimation, 
etc.,  
 
Figure 2.4 Design Flow for User Interface 
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Each one of these WAMPAC applications correspond to a specific scenario and based on 
the user input they will be presented with subsequent web pages to select and map physical 
components such as relays and PMUs appropriately into their experiment, and also it determines 
the type and number of SCADA VM's needed. For the cyber system configuration, the user 
interface provides user with options to select the network topology in which SCADA components 
should be connected. 
 As part of defense measures, the user can select from either host based defense or network 
based defense. Based on their inputs, user interface provides options to select from defense 
methodologies such as firewall, intrusion detection and prevention based defense, etc., for 
implementation. For orchestrating the attack, the user interface provides a list of attack vectors 
such as DOS attack, Command injection attack, coordinated attack to choose from, along with 
options to choose the attack locations on the system selected. The user interface has a visualization 
component where remote users can observe the status of the physical devices that are part of the 
attack on the cyber layer, and also simultaneously observe the power system impacts on the real-
time power system simulator through real-time simulation plots. Once the experiment has been 
performed, the user interface facilitates the collection of cyber system impacts such as 
downloading packet captures, log files etc., during attack phase. As part of power system impacts, 
the user interface provides the option of data collection relevant to power 
system parameters such as voltage and power flow plots. 
2.2.2.2 Experiment Automation 
Figure 2.5 lists the various activities as part of the design flow that relate to experiment 
automation. Each of the activities are implemented using the backend orchestration framework 
through appropriate slave scripts that communicate to a master script. With respect to the power 
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system configuration, the automation tasks involve loading, compilation of the appropriate power 
system model such as the IEEE 9 bus system model simulator, initializing the runtime interface, 
and ensuring that the model has reached its steady state operating condition before any attack 
actions are started.  
 
Figure 2.5 Design Flow for Experiment Automation 
Depending on the WAMPAC experiment selection made, the backend automation scripts 
would configure physical components accordingly so that they could be mapped into the power 
system model for hardware-in-the-loop experiments, and also verify their integration with the 
runtime interface. With respect to automating the cyber system, the back-end configuration module 
spawns control center and substation VM's appropriately, and initializes the VM's in a specific 
network topology. Also, the scripts verify if inter-device communication is successful before 
proceeding further. Based on user selection, the backend scripts implement and initialize network 
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based or host based defense measures such as firewalls, or intrusion detection systems on gateway 
nodes or on the hosts such as substation VM's. As part of attack orchestration, the backend scripts 
would spawn attacker VM's, which have a library of pre-defined attack modules. Based on the 
experiment scenario, the master script coordinates and triggers the specific attack scripts on these 
VM's. 
Once the experiment has successfully begun, the backend scripts periodically poll the status 
of various devices involved in the experiment in the cyber layer, and update a run-time 
visualization screen on the front-end web server. Simultaneously, the web-based interface can also 
provide another screen with the run-time interface on the power system control VM to see the 
impact of the attacks on the power system. Depending on the type of power system simulator 
selected and the type of outputs requested by the user (i.e. real-time outputs vs. offline plots), the 
automation scripts would be adapted to provide real-time outputs or data files that are collected 
for the experimental scenario accordingly. As part of collecting the results on the cyber layer, the 
back-end scripts would pull log files from the VM's where defense measures were deployed such 
as firewall and IDS logs, and packet captures from the gateway node, besides other network 
performance statistics. Similarly, the scripts on the power system control node would pull power 
system simulation artifacts such as data files or plots and make them available to the user as 
experimental results. 
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CHAPTER 3 
STORY-BOARDS & CASESTUDY 
3.1 Story-Board Constructs 
 The PowerCyber remote access framework has been implemented using story board based 
approach. This implementation facilitates ease of use for a versatile community of users with 
different expertise and also serves as an educational platform that allows users to learn about the 
importance and criticality of cyber security of critical infrastructures such as smart grid. The 
remote access framework supports the following story board constructs [32]. 
3.1.1 Story-Board 1 - Cascading outage through a coordinated attack on power system 
protection scheme 
In this scenario, the attack involves a combination of two coordinated attack actions on a 
power system protection scheme known as Remedial Action Scheme (RAS). Typically, RAS are 
intended to take specific protective measures to prevent the spread of large disturbances under 
heavy system loading conditions. However, the attacker intelligently triggers the operation of this 
RAS by creating a data integrity attack on unencrypted communication between the substation and 
the control center that uses the DNP3 protocol. In order to create a cascading outage, the attacker 
also blocks the communication between the protection relays that are involved in the RAS through 
a targeted Denial of Service (DoS) attack on one of the protection controllers. This prevents the 
successful operation of the RAS and in turn initiates secondary protection to be tripped to avoid 
thermal overload on the impacted transmission line. As a result of this coordinated attack involving 
data integrity attack to trip a breaker and a DoS attack on RAS communications, the overall system 
frequency is also affected as it causes the islanding of a generator from the rest of the system. 
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3.1.2 Story-Board 2 - Manipulating AGC measurements/controls to affect system frequency  
In this scenario, the attack involves a stealthy manipulation of measurements/controls used 
in Automatic Generation Control (AGC) algorithm to destabilize and affect the frequency of the 
power grid. This attack is a version of the classic Man-in-the-Middle attack, where the attacker 
intercepts the communication between the control center and the remote substations and chooses 
to stealthily modify either the frequency or tie-line measurements going to the control center, or 
the AGC control commands going to the generating stations. This is achieved by executing an 
ARP poisoning attack first, which tricks the remote substation to forward the data to the attacker 
before sending it to the external gateway. The attacker then selects the appropriate information 
that is to be replaced and modifies it appropriately using custom attack scripts and forwards it to 
the external gateway. As a result of this manipulation, there is a steady frequency deviation in the 
system. Eventually, this frequency deviation causes the load in the system to be shed in an attempt 
to restore frequency. A sustained attack could potentially lead to a major portion of the load in the 
power system to be unserved. 
3.1.3 Story-Board 3 - Manipulating SCADA measurements to affect situational awareness in 
State Estimator 
In this scenario, the attack involves a careful manipulation of the measurements (analog 
and status) that come from the substation remote terminal units (RTU) to the control center for 
State Estimation. The attacker performs a stealthy attack where he exploits his knowledge about 
the measurement configurations at multiple substations to carefully select the locations where he 
would manipulate the measurements. The attack vector involves the classic Man-in-the-Middle 
attack, where the attacker tricks the RTU to forward all its data to the attacker’s machine instead 
of the substation gateway using an ARP poisoning attack. By decoding the unencrypted network 
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traffic, the attacker selects and modifies appropriately certain targeted measurements to avoid 
detection by the State Estimator’s Bad Data Detectors. This does not cause any bad data alarms in 
the control center and consequently, the attacker succeeds in impeding the situational awareness 
capabilities of the operator. Consequently, all applications that rely on State Estimator would be 
affected such as Contingency Analysis, Power Markets, etc., Also, this attack could be used to 
further trigger other attacks that could cause additional damage such as opening/overloading 
critical transmission lines. 
3.1.4 Story-Board 4 - Using unencrypted RTU communication to send arbitrary commands 
to trip breakers 
The attacker gains physical access to the process WAN, on which he is able to gain a 
network address. As the data flows between RTUs and SCADA are not encrypted the attacker is 
able to read any transmitted data in clear text. The attacker uses this opportunity to perform an 
ARP spoof attack and position himself between an RTU and the PCU (i.e., a man-in-the-middle 
attack). As such, the attacker is able to both send malicious requests to the RTU and hide to the 
operator the real events. The attacker uses this for an unauthorized opening of a distribution feeder 
breaker feeding a major manufacturing industry connected directly on the 40 kv level. The 
attacker’s intention is to create a power outage that will severely disturb or stop the production in 
a continuously operated plant in order to create economical and/or physical damage. 
3.1.5 Story-Board 5 - Denial of Service attack on RTU/protection devices communication to 
blind SCADA  
The attacker has physical access to the RTU communication network and is as such able 
to connect his own equipment to the network using a switch in an unmanned substation. From this 
point the attacker floods a number of logical connections with a continuous stream of packets, 
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which creates an overload in the Front-End applications and blinds the operators to what is 
happening in the grid. The attacker has chosen a time for the attack when a severe snow and ice 
storm is expected and the control operators are unable to counteract the loss of physical devices 
created by the storm. This leads to an overload of power lines feeding the capital city and this also 
goes unnoticed in the control center. The blind SCADA severely delays the power restoration 
efforts to reenergize the capital city. 
3.1.6 Story-Board 6 - Exploiting Social Engineering to gain access to Energy Management 
Systems/ Substation Workstations 
An uninformed operator in the control room connects his workstation to Internet during a 
night shift. He does this to be able to use Facebook to chat with his friends and to surf on Internet. 
This operator has the tendency to accept any friend request on Facebook and add as his friend. The 
attacker uses this to request the operator to add him as a friend. In a chat, his Facebook friend sends 
him a link that was created by an attacker. Without becoming suspicious, the operator clicks on 
the link and gives the attacker access to his control room workstation. The attacker is now able to 
remotely connect to this system and he can open a shell with root privileges on the compromised 
system. From his own location the attacker is now able to open SCADA displays containing real-
time information from the grid and to execute commands. He uses this to open HV breakers in the 
power grid, which leads to cascading events that causes a total blackout of the high voltage grid. 
3.1.7 Story-Board 7 - Manipulating protection settings using Substation Automation tools 
The attacker is an employee of the attacked utility and he has access to substations and to 
substation engineering tools. He uses the engineering tools for the substation protection devices to 
set line protection parameters to default values. The default values in the protection devices are 
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defined at such low limits that the protection devices will trip all power lines also at a normal 
operating state. The attack is done in a central HV/MV substation on the MV side and it will cause 
a total blackout in the capital city.  
3.2 Case Study 
 This section describes how the remote access CPS security testbed was used to perform a 
coordinated attack/defense experiment on a wide-area protection scheme. The experimental 
scenario involves a coordinated cyber-attack on a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS), which is a 
commonly used Wide-Area Protection scheme, as specified in [9]. Once the remote users login by 
providing their credentials, the user interface collects various information. For this case study, the 
IEEE 9-bus power system model was chosen, and RAS scheme was chosen as the WAMPAC 
experimental scenario. The web interface presents a set of options for mapping the RAS onto the 
generators in the 9 bus system model. As part of the back-end orchestration framework, the power 
system control VM is spawned and the runtime interface of the real-time power system simulator 
is triggered. The IEEE 9-bus model with RAS is then initialized on the run-time interface of the 
real-time power system simulator. The back-end framework triggers the SCADA configuration 
module, which spawns SCADA VM’s corresponding to power system simulation and checks 
network connectivity between devices. Upon successfully spawning the SCADA VM's, the user 
is provided with options to perform reconnaissance and enumeration followed by list of attack 
options such as gaining foothold in the internal SCADA network, data integrity attack, DoS attack 
etc., In this case study, a coordinated attack is chosen. The first part of the coordinated attack 
involves a data integrity attack by executing a malicious command injection to the substation RTU 
at bus 7 to trip one of the physical relays involved in the RAS. The second element in the 
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coordinated attack involves a DoS attack on the RAS controller, which is another physical relay 
to block communication between the RAS controller and the generator controller. The users can 
select whether a defense measure is to be implemented as part of the experimental scenario. For 
this experimental scenario, the possible defense measures include a firewall rule at the substation 
gateway node to whitelist communication into the substation and updating security patches. This 
prevents the data integrity attack from succeeding and also prevents attacker infiltration into the 
internal SCADA network. Also, the users can select to implement throttling of the network traffic 
on the substation gateway to ensure that the impact of the DoS attack is minimized. The cyber 
layer visualization system constantly updates the status of the physical relays on the experiment to 
show the attack impacts. In addition to the visualization, as a part of post-attack data collection, 
the framework allows users to download capture of communication packets between all devices 
(cyber & physical). These packet captures can be used to analyze and understand the 
communication flow in the system before and after attack implementation which might be useful 
in design of anomaly detection algorithms. The power system run-time interface provides the users 
with real-time power system outputs as the attack is being executed. Also, it provides the users to 
interact with the power system model by applying manual control actions directly through the GUI. 
The framework provides two options for analyzing the power system impacts: real-time outputs 
for the users to observe vs. data files that could be processed offline. For this case study, only the 
real-time outputs option has been shown. As an additional feature, the framework will provide an 
option in the future to collect data files corresponding to appropriate power system parameters in 
the system model such as voltages, power flows and system frequency.  
The reminder of this section captures the sample case study with step-by-step explanations and 
corresponding screen shots. 
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Step 1: To gain access to remote access framework, the users connect to PowerCyber laboratory virtual private network (VPN). 
This is done by downloading VPN clients such as OpenVPN, Viscosity or Tunnelblick and providing certificates and credentials for 
VPN access. Upon successful connection to VPN, the remote users connect to PowerCyber remote access framework URL and 
provide credentials to log into the framework. 
 
 
3
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Step 2: Upon succesfull login, the interface provides story board scenarios for the remote users to choose from. A detailed description 
of story board scenario selected is displayed to the user. The screenshot below captures the description of Story Board 1: Cascading 
outage through a coordinated attack on power system protection scheme. 
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Step 3: The next webpage provides an overview video snippet of the scenario described in Story Board 1 [12]. The video 
demonstarates the impact of coordinated attack (data integrity and denial of service) on IEEE 9-bus system distributed across the 
state of IOWA. The video uses OPC server interfacing with SICAM and Google earth interface for visualizing the scenario decribed. 
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Step 4: The next webpage is the home page which is categorized into four main modules: Real-Time Grid Simulation, SCADA 
Configuration, Attack Orchestration and Defense Instrumentation. These four modules are the fundamental building blocks for 
orchestrating attack/defense experimentation in PowerCybed testbed environment. 
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Step 5: The real-time grid simulation module involves selection of IEEE Bus Model (such as 9-bus, 39-bus, etc.) from a drop down 
menu followed by selection of WAMPAC(Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection and Control) systems. The framework provides three 
WAMPAC types for selection, namely: Remedial Action Scheme (Wide-Area Protection scheme), Automatic Generation Control 
(Wide-Area Control scheme) and State Estimation (Wide-Area Monitoring scheme). 
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Step 6: For enhancing user programmability, second step in real-time grid simulation module involves identification of how the 
physical components should be mapped to the power system model. In particular, this case study identifies three possible positions 
for placing Remedial Action Scheme on IEEE 9-bus system, namely: Remedial Action Scheme for Generator 2, Remedial Action 
Scheme for Generator 1 and Remedial Action Scheme for Generator 3. 
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Step 7: The model selected by remote user is compiled, loaded and executed on the real-time power system simulator and the run 
time visualization environment is provided to the user. The environment provides meters representing generation levels, overall 
system frequency, tie-line flows of transmission lines, bus voltages and loads to clearly capture the state of power system model 
before and after cyber-attack, defense simulation. 
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Step 8: The SCADA configuration module is responsible for spawning SCADA virtual machines and communication topology on 
the DELL PowerEdge ESXi server at PowerCyber Lab.  
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Specifically, the topology spawned for story board 1 consists of three networks: SCADA Control 
network, SCADA Substation Network and Wide Area Network (WAN). Virtual 
switches(vSwitch) were spawned in ESXi server (one each for each network) to create network 
topologies required for experimentation. 
1. SCADA Control network (10.1.1.0/24) – consists of Primary control center (10.1.1.10/24), 
Secondary control center (10.1.1.20/24), and Control gateway (10.1.1.1/24). 
2. SCADA Substation network (10.2.2.0/24) – consists of Substation simulator (10.2.2.10/24) 
and Substation gateway (10.2.2.1/24). The Substation simulator is in turn connected to the physical 
Siemens and Schweitzer relays in PowerCyber testbed environment. 
3. Wide Area Network (WAN) (192.168.16.0/24) - connects the Control gateway 
(192.168.16.160/24) and Substation gateway (192.168.16.150/24) using a site-to-site OPEN VPN 
tunnel which encrypts two-way SCADA communication between control centers and substation. 
The Attacker virtual machine (192.168.16.140/24) running Kali Linux operating system is also 
connected to the Wide Area Network for providing the remote user with capabilities to perform 
penetration testing in PowerCyber testbed SCADA environment. 
Step 9: The Attack orchestration module involves two steps: 1. Reconnaissance and Enumeration 
2. Vulnerability Exploitation. Each of these steps are subdivided into four steps respectively. 
During reconnaissance phase, interesting information about the target is collected which is used 
during enumeration phase to identify possible entry points into the internal network. In 
vulnerability exploitation phase, the identified security weaknesses are exploited to gain access 
into the internal SCADA communication network which results in manifestation of SCADA 
virtual machines causing physical impacts on power system models. 
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Step 9.1: During host discovery, the attacker tries identifying internet facing hosts on the target 192.168.16.0/24 network using 
nmap command which performs ping sweep and prints out available hosts that responded to host discovery probes. In this scenario, 
192.168.16.160 (Control gateway) and 192.168.16.150(Substation gateway) are identified as being live.   
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Step 9.2: In network sniffing phase, the attacker captures all traffic between the discovered hosts 192.168.16.160 and 
192.168.16.150. Due to the presence of site-to-site VPN tunnel between the Control gateway and Substation gateway, the Attacker 
is unsuccessful in decrypting the contents of packets exchanged between the Control Center and Substation. The attacker now tries 
identifying backdoor techniques to penetrate into the internal network. 
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Step 9.3: The attacker next performs intense port scanning to identify top ten TCP ports which are open on the target hosts using 
nmap commands. In this scenario, TCP port running SSH service and TCP port running HTTPS are identified by the attacker as 
being open on the target hosts. 
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Step 9.4: Vulnerability scanning identifies that the Substation gateway is vulnerable to Heartbleed bug which is a serious 
vulnerability in OpenSSL cryptographic software library that allows the attacker to steal information protected by the SSL/TLS 
encryption used to secure the internet. 
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Step 9.5: In vulnerability exploitation phase initially, the remote attacker exploits Heartbleed vulnerability which allows the attacker 
to obtain up to 64 KB of unencrypted sensitive data from the memory of a vulnerable OpenSSL server. In this scenario the credentials 
(username and password) of the Substation gateway vulnerable to Heartbleed is extracted by the attacker using packets that trigger 
a buffer over-read. 
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Step 9.6: The attacker makes use of credentials obtained using Heartbleed vulnerability to gain SSH access into the substation 
gateway. This in turn allows the attacker to obtain root access with administrator privilege and capture two-way SCADA 
communication traffic between control center and substation. This step serves as the stepping stone for performing a successful 
coordinated attack on the power system model. 
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Step 9.7: The attacker now triggers the Denial of Service attack which is the first step towards execution of successful coordinated 
attack. Button click opens up Low Orbit Ion Canon (LOIC) front-end simulation in a new tab where DOS attack parameters such as 
target IP Address, port, method, threads and throttle are configured and the attack is successfully triggered. 
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Step 9.8: The attacker now triggers the command injection attack which is the second step towards execution of successful 
coordinated attack. Button click triggers a python script in the backend which establishes socket connection to substation simulator 
and sends malicious DNP3 control packet to the substation. This Denial of service and command injection together cause cascading 
outage in the underlying power system model. 
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Step 10: The Defense Instrumentation module provides basic defense options such as firewall configuration, closing unused ports, 
patching updates, etc.  
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Step 10.1: SCADA network-flow based firewall implementation, blocks flow of DNP3 control commands to substation from hosts 
other than primary or secondary control centers. When, the attacker python script tries establishing socket connection to the 
substation on DNP3 port, the firewall blocks connections to port from non-control center hosts. 
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Step 10.2: Closing SSH port 22 on substation gateway interface facing wide-area network, prevents the attacker from penetrating 
into the substation internal network. Updating the OpenSSL library in the substation gateway patches Heart Bleed bug. This prevents 
the discovery and exploitation of this vulnerability. 
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CHAPTER 4 
USER COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT STUDIES  
 One of the most important goals of developing remote access framework was enabling 
access to a broader user community such as academia, research and industrial users interested in 
cyber security experimentation on cyber physical systems such as smart grid. This would allow 
enhancement and refinement of PowerCyber testbed features as well as remote access framework 
features going forward. This chapter will provide detailed descriptions about PowerCyber remote 
access framework user community engagement with use case studies.   
4.1 Academic user engagement 
4.1.1 Background 
 University of Minnesota – Duluth(UMND) 
As part of graduate level electrical engineering course EE5533 Grid: Resiliency, Efficiency & 
Technology offered by Dr. Desineni Subbaram Naidu, Minnesota Power Jack Rowe Endowed 
Chair, University of Minnesota, Duluth, PowerCyber testbed and remote access framework for 
PowerCyber were introduced to UMND students through guest lectures. A user manual explaining 
remote access framework usage was also provided to students. Access to remote access framework 
was made available to students interested in performing experimentation on PowerCyber testbed. 
In total, fourteen students from the course signed up for experimentation and used the PowerCyber 
remote access framework. 
 Iowa State University(ISU) 
As part of graduate level course CprE 539: Cyber Security for the Smart Grid offered by Dr. 
Manimaran Govindarasu, Mehl Professor and Associate Chair, Department of Electrical and 
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Computer Engineering, Iowa State University, the PowerCyber testbed and remote access 
framework for PowerCyber were introduced to ISU students. The students were asked to perform 
remote experimentation on PowerCyber testbed using the framework as part of course project. In 
total, the course had eight students with equal distribution power engineers and computer 
engineers.  
4.1.2 Experimentation Overview 
  The main goal of the experimentation project was to allow students to characterize the 
impact of different types of cyber-attacks on different power system models using remote access 
framework to PowerCyber testbed. The students experimented different types of attack scenarios 
on 9 bus system model. The web interface presented a set of options for mapping the RAS in 
different positions onto the generators in the 9 bus system model. After compiling and loading the 
chosen power system model, the students were asked to note down pre-attack values such as 
generation level of generators G1, G2 and G3, overall system frequency, tie-line flows (active 
power) of all 6 transmission lines and bus voltages by referring to the power system run-time 
interface. The web interface also provided options for triggering different attack vectors such as 
command injection attacks, coordinated attack, Denial of service attack with handles for tweaking 
DOS throttles, etc. Upon successful execution of attacks, the students were asked to note down 
post-attack values from the power system run-time interface. The following scenarios were 
experimented by students to perform impact studies. 
 Scenario 1 
In scenario 1, the Remedial action scheme is mapped onto generator 2. The first attack, injects 
malicious command to the substation RTU at bus 7 to trip one of the physical relays involved in 
the RAS. In second attack, DoS attack on the RAS controller is triggered by setting DOS throttle 
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to fastest and then malicious command is injected after approximately 10 seconds to the substation 
RTU at bus 7 to trip one of the physical relays involved in the RAS as depicted in Figure 4.1. This 
attack triggers a successful coordinated attack resulting in considerable drop in system frequency.  
 
Figure 4.1 RAS on G2 coordinated attack 
In third attack, DoS attack on the RAS controller is triggered by setting DOS throttle to slowest 
and then malicious command is injected after approximately 10 seconds to the substation RTU at 
bus 7 to trip one of the physical relays involved in the RAS. Due to slow DOS throttle, this attack 
results in unsuccessful coordinated attack creating impact similar to first attack. 
 Scenario 2 
In scenario1, the Remedial Action Scheme is mapped onto generator 1. The first attack, injects 
malicious command to the substation RTU at bus 4 to trip one of the physical relays involved in 
the RAS. In second attack, DoS attack on the RAS controller is triggered by setting DoS throttle 
to fastest and then malicious command is injected after approximately 10 seconds to the substation 
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RTU at bus 4 to trip one of the physical relays involved in the RAS as depicted in Figure 4.2. This 
attack triggers a successful coordinated attack resulting in considerable drop in system frequency.  
 
Figure 4.2 RAS on G1 coordinated attack 
In third attack, DoS attack on the RAS controller is triggered by setting DoS throttle to slowest 
and then malicious command is injected after approximately 10 seconds to the substation RTU at 
bus 4 to trip one of the physical relays involved in the RAS. Due to slow DoS throttle, this attack 
results in unsuccessful coordinated attack creating impact similar to first attack. 
 Scenario 3 
In scenario1, the Remedial action scheme is mapped onto generator 3. The first attack, injects 
malicious command to the substation RTU at bus 9 to trip one of the physical relays involved in 
the RAS. In second attack, DoS attack on the RAS controller is triggered by setting DoS throttle 
to fastest and then malicious command is injected after approximately 10 seconds to the substation 
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RTU at bus 9 to trip one of the physical relays involved in the RAS as depicted in Figure 4.3. This 
attack triggers a successful coordinated attack resulting in considerable drop in system frequency.  
 
Figure 4.3 RAS on G3 coordinated attack 
In third attack, DoS attack on the RAS controller is triggered by setting DoS throttle to 
slowest and then malicious command is injected after approximately 10 seconds to the substation 
RTU at bus 9 to trip one of the physical relays involved in the RAS. Due to slow DoS throttle, this 
attack results in unsuccessful coordinated attack creating impact similar to first attack. 
Finally, the students were asked to compare pre-attack, post-attack values obtained in all 
three scenarios to identify the RAS position and type of attack which created maximum 
disturbance in the power system with reasoning. 
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4.1.3 User Survey & Evaluation 
Upon successful completion of experimental project, the users were distributed a survey to 
help understand remote access framework usage experience and identify avenues for enhancing 
the framework for future users and returning users. The survey consisted of twelve questions in 
total which comprised of six ranking questions, three multiple choice questions and three text entry 
descriptive questions. The reminder of this section will provide details of the survey with 
corresponding results. 
 Question 1:  
Select your University 
Responses: 
Table 4.1 University selection 
 
 Question 2: 
Please indicate level of education 
Responses: 
Table 4.2 Level of education 
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 Question 3: 
Please indicate majors 
Responses: 
Table 4.3 Majors selection 
 
 Question 4: 
Please indicate level of proficiency in cybersecurity concepts 
Responses: 
Table 4.4 Cybersecurity proficiency 
 
 Question 5: 
Please indicate level of proficiency in power engineering concepts 
Responses: 
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Table 4.5 Power engineering proficiency 
 
 Question 6: 
Please rate the quality of instructions provided by the remote interface user manual 
Responses: 
Table 4.6 User manual clarity 
 
 Question 7: 
Please rate clarity of instructions provided by the experimentation document 
Responses: 
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Table 4.7 Experiment documentation clarity 
 
 
 Question 8: 
Please rate ease of use of remote access framework in performing experimentation. Was the 
framework self-explanatory? 
Responses: 
Table 4.8 Remote access framework – Ease of use 
 
 Question 9: 
Please indicate improvisations which can be made to the remote access framework to enhance 
your usage experience 
Responses: 
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Table 4.9 Improvisation suggestions from users 
 
Text Response 
 
It's fine just the way it is now. 
 
We experienced server issues, but I am not sure how they could have been resolved. 
 
Can't think of any 
 
None 
 
A better explanation of what's happening in the lab. At the moment, the user clicks a button and 
the grid has issues - there's not a whole lot of explanation of what's happening. 
 
The experience has been excellent. 
 
If somehow you can make the resetting possible for the remote user (without the help of in lab 
person) it would really help. 
 
Better access 
 
N/A 
 
To be able to switch between RAS positions without having to go back to the homepage first. 
 
We encountered some difficulty in executing the attack scenario, I hope it is being resolved by 
now. 
 
I wish we did some more labs to get even better understanding 
 
control and substation should be updated 
 
It was fine. 
 
According to me, the attacks can be made better visible using the UI. 
 
Add something to allow for more experimentation and self-exploration of the systems. 
 
 
 Question 10: 
Please indicate your takeaway from this experimentation 
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Responses: 
Table 4.10 Experimentation takeaway 
 
Text Response 
 
 
The experiment let us know the power side impacts because of the cyber-attacks. 
 
The cascading effects on the grid after a system disturbance. 
 
was good 
 
Learnt to perform different attacks on a cyber physical system 
 
After this experience, I researched grid security and learned quite a bit about the security that's 
needed and the attacks that exist for it. 
 
The experience has been excellent. 
 
Well, I got a closer look what impact does a certain attack has on the grid. 
 
Good 
 
A better understanding of grid security 
 
To give some insight as to how a cyber attack would be orchestrated so that such an attack might 
be stopped in the future. 
 
The experiment was well designed and properly explained. It was easy to understand the 
difference in the impact of different attack scenario and thus value of a coordinated attack was 
highlighted. I was able to relate this with our course module and class discussions very much. It 
is good for a power engineer to find out research problems as in terms of placement of RAS, 
impact characterization etc. 
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Table 4.10 (continued) 
I learned a lot practically. 
 
good learning experience about cyber and power integration 
 
The final project was a much more valuable learning tool that the remote interface. 
 
I did the DOS attacks in the computer networks before but, the DOS attacks in the cyber lab 
made more sense and were very practical. 
 
Having vulnerabilities in power grids can be devastating 
 
 
 Question 11: 
If given an opportunity to reuse the testbed, please specify what kind of experimentation would 
you like to perform using PowerCyber remote access framework 
Responses: 
Table 4.11 Experimentation enhancement 
 
Text Response 
 
 
Malware injection, Reverse TCP handling. 
 
I honestly cannot say there is anything more I would include. 
 
Defense 
 
Simulation of larger power system models 
 
I would like to watch the system while doing the attacks instead of switching platforms so I 
could watch any changes immediately. 
 
Perhaps one more experiment with (previous) real-world cyber-attacks may be included. 
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Table 4.11 (continued) 
Something to determine/get access to the system (brute forcing password with rainbow tables, 
etc.). This would be a new direction for the lab 
 
Coordinated 
 
Nothing more than we did 
 
I would like to do more variations of the DOS attack. 
 
This experiment was good, if with time we increase the system size and variation in attack 
methods it would be more useful and good from learning point of view. 
 
to know more about how to block bugs 
 
malware based attack 
 
N/A 
 
I would experiment more on UDP attacks which are more effective and also would try to find 
out a way to identify and prevent UDP attacks. 
 
The effects of attacking multiple generators at the same time 
 
 
 Question 12: 
Please rate the overall quality of the experimentation and associated learning experience 
Responses: 
Table 4.12 Experimentation quality 
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4.1.4 Testimonials 
This section highlights few testimonials about the PowerCyber remote access framework. 
“I completely realize that there has been lot of interest, effort and time put into the offering of 
guest lectures and working with students to conduct CPS security testbed for power grid 
experimentations via “remote access interface” with the Dept. of Electrical and Computer 
Engineering, Iowa State University (ISU). I want to express my sincere thanks and appreciation 
to both of you. Hopefully, the next time we offer, I will make sure all the students go through the 
lab experience. “ 
                                                                                                           Dr. Desineni Subbaram Naidu 
“Thanks again for allowing us to do this experiment, it was very informative! I am a very hands-
on, visual type learner and this really helped clarify how the grid operates.” 
 
               Maxwell Tesch, Student UMND 
 
4.2 Industrial user engagement 
4.2.1 Background 
One of the most important use cases of PowerCyber testbed is providing controlled testing 
environments for evaluating and validating novel CPS security tools and technologies, thereby 
accelerating the transition of research to industrial practice. Symantec Corporation, an American 
technology company which develops security products and solutions to protect small, medium, 
and enterprise businesses from advanced threats, malware, and other cyber-attacks, expressed 
interest in utilizing PowerCyber testbed remotely for developing and validating their ICS, anomaly 
detection product in a close to realistic SCADA testbed such as the one provided by PowerCyber.  
4.2.2 Product Overview 
The Symantec product is a Java based solution which serves as a network based anomaly 
detection engine which learns all SCADA communication traffic in the control and substation 
networks to create a profiling of expected regular traffic flow in the SCADA environment. After 
successful profiling, the product actively segregates anomalous traffic from regular traffic. 
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4.2.3 Phase 1 Engagement (completed) 
 Initially, the engagement required capturing all possible SCADA traffic such as DNP3, 
IEC61850, etc. between control centers, substations and physical relays during normal operations 
and abnormal operations such as attack scenarios. For executing this requirement, an interface in 
the master network switch in PowerCyber testbed was made to listen and capture all traffic in 
promiscuous traffic. The regular traffic was captured continuously for four hours with attack traffic 
injected in regular intervals. This capture was used by Symantec to develop logic for their anomaly 
detection engine. 
4.2.4 Phase 2 Engagement (ongoing) 
 Second phase of engagement required integration of Symantec anomaly detection product 
into PowerCyber testbed for validating the detection capabilities of the product.  
 
Figure 4.4 Symantec Deployment topology 
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For integration of the product, the Symantec collaborator was introduced to PowerCyber testbed 
architecture, remote access framework, remote access user manual, attack vectors and other 
relevant documentation along with demonstration sessions to provide an insight of the PowerCyber 
testbed capabilities and identify use cases relevant to Symantec. For building appropriate 
integration topology, many on call meetings were held to gather requirements which satisfies 
Symantec use cases. Consecutively, a topology for deploying Symantec product was developed 
and the product is currently being installed in PowerCyber testbed. Figure 4.4 captures the 
deployment topology of Symantec anomaly detection product in PowerCyber testbed. 
 
Upon successful integration and execution of test cases in future, the Symantec anomaly detection 
product will be trained to profile normal and anomalous SCADA traffic using network traffic 
monitoring performed in PowerCyber testbed. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
5.1 Conclusion 
The need to enable remote access to CPS security testbeds is quite compelling in the 
context of accelerating research and development by enabling access to a broader research/ 
academic community. Existing research efforts on enabling remote access have been successful in 
providing infrastructure for regular cyber security experimentation [16]. However, they have 
several shortcomings when extended to CPS environments with a heterogeneous mix of simulated, 
emulated and physical components. There are promising ongoing efforts made to provide scalable, 
multi-user remote access CPS security testbeds for researchers and this thesis describes the 
architecture and capabilities of PowerCyber remote access framework for cyber physical security 
experimentation on Smart Grid applications, which is one such efforts. Though the implementation 
architecture described in this thesis is far from being perfect or comprehensive, it provides a solid 
foundation for further R&D in enabling remote experimentation and is also being actively refined. 
The thesis also articulates user community engagements and various engineering challenges in 
creating remote access testbeds along with some potential solutions that would serve to educate a 
broader research community. Due to some of the practical challenges faced, only a limited set of 
template-based scenarios have been implemented completely at this time. 
5.2 Future Work 
In order to broaden the scope and features of PowerCyber remote access framework, the 
following activities would be performed: 
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5.2.1 Developing a library of models, attack vectors  
Additional power system models would be developed along with template attack scenarios for 
commonly used WAMPAC applications such as State Estimation, Automatic Generation Control, 
etc., 
5.2.2 Expanding user community  
A user community would be developed for PowerCyber remote access framework and 
existing user community engagements will also be expanded by providing access to a broader 
research, academic and industrial community. This would also enable the refinement of the 
testbed's features going forward. 
5.2.3 Improving the programmability 
The programmability of the remote access framework would be improved by allowing 
more user customization of power system models and experimental scenarios, dynamic 
configuration/mapping of hardware devices, custom attack vectors, and defense measures. 
5.2.4 Federation   
The remote access framework would be expanded to address federated testbed resources 
to provide increased scalability, and multi-user experimental capabilities. 
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